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For Dealing
With The
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NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE SERIOUS OFFENDER

BY JOAN PETERSILIA

Ms. Petersilia is a criminologist with the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica

This paper, a product of the Rand Corporation's Research Agreements Program, focuses on the serious habitual offender and summarizes current policy directions for dealing more effectively with this kind of offender. A number of major policy issues are addressed, among them: shifting the violent juvenile to the adult criminal court; increasing the reliance placed on mere incapacitation; moving toward mandatory, determinate sentencing; making use of voluntary rehabilitation programs; lessening plea bargaining; and increasing the use of proactive policing.

We are quite possibly at the threshold of a major new penal reform movement. In recent years the balance in criminal justice thinking has been shifting from an emphasis on rehabilitation (to be accomplished through diversion, probation, and parole, coupled with treatment programs, both within and outside of correctional institutions) to a more "hard-line" view that emphasizes incapacitation by means of imprisonment. The latter posture seeks to enhance public safety by removing offenders from the streets and by heightening the deterrence of crime through the use of harsher punishment. The change is occurring, in part, because of a growing disillusionment with what was once viewed as the main task of the prisons: rehabilitation, or reform, of criminals. And in part, it is motivated by a belief that the crime problem has been exacerbated by the existence of a relatively small, hard-core element of habitual offenders who are repeatedly apprehended but who, after returning to the streets, commit more crimes. This latter belief received empirical support in the early 1970's from the landmark cohort study of Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin.¹ They reported that a small fraction of the offenders studied accounted for a disproportionately large number of the serious offenses. This study brought to the forefront the concept of the chronic or career offender, and this class of offenders is achieving increased recognition as a distinct, and extremely important, issue in the criminal justice field. President Ford recently said of career criminals: "The career criminal is a one-man crime wave. If we can bring him to a speedy trial, try him for his most serious offense, and make sure that, if found guilty, he is sent back to prison, we can give the streets back to the people. Our job is to put the career criminal out of business."²

¹ Marvin Wolfgang, Robert M. Figlio, Thorsten Sellin, *Delinquency in a Birth Cohort*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1972.

² Gerald R. Ford (Speech before International Association of Chiefs of Police, Miami, Florida, November 1976). Note: A version of this paper was presented at the American Society of Criminology, 1976.

It is also felt that the habitual offender's past experience in dealing with an overburdened criminal justice system frequently enables him to return soon after an arrest to the community where he is able to resume his criminal activities. LEAA administrator Richard Velde has said, "such criminals are often not caught because they are too clever and too experienced. And, if arrested, they often 'beat the rap' by using continuances and other ploys in court."³ Before his election, President Jimmy Carter recently said that he favored a:

. . . shifting back toward the removal of technicalities which obviously prevent the conviction and punishment of those who are guilty. I believe the Burger court is moving back in the proper direction. We went too far and it got so that sincere, honest, dedicated, competent law enforcement officers found it almost impossible to comply with all the technicalities that might be raised in court or on appeal and obviously guilty people were released unpunished. Society, in the process, suffered.⁴

The public is also prepared to support a tougher stance for the habitual offender. In a 1972 public opinion survey⁵ 79 percent of the respondents indicated that they were *more likely* to vote for a candidate who advocated tougher sentences for lawbreakers as opposed to the 10 percent who were less likely to vote for such a candidate—11 percent were undecided. But a threshold of difficulty besets attempts to control them better. Namely, who are the persons deserving of the harsher treatment and, in particular, who warrant protracted periods of imprisonment? Most experts agree that harsh treatment should be applied to those who have exhibited serious criminal conduct—but how should "seriousness" be judged? Seriousness of conduct necessarily embraces the defendant's prior criminal record, not only the number of his previous convictions, but also the gravity of the crimes involved. The more serious the offender's record, the more severely should be his punishment for the current offense. One rationale for this position is predictive: The more someone has significantly offended in the past, the more likely he is to do it again—and hence, arguably, the greater reason for restraining him. Another rationale has to do with deterrence: Having continued to commit crimes despite previous punishment, repeaters have demonstrated a greater penalty is needed to induce them to desist.⁶

Policymakers appear to be convinced that measures should be taken to more effectively curb those persons who can be identified as serious habitual offenders. What are the policy measures likely to be? The remainder of this paper outlines the most basic dimensions around which such changes will be based.

³ "A War on Career Criminals Starts to Show Results," *U.S. News & World Report*, November 22, 1976, pp. 73-75.

⁴ Speech delivered by Jimmy Carter in the Presidential campaign in Phoenix, Arizona, on September 14, 1976.

⁵ American Institute of Public Opinion, Study No. 856.

⁶ von Hirsch, *Doing Justice*, McGraw-Hill, 1976, p. 85.

Shift Juveniles to Adult Felony Proceedings

The current juvenile justice system has, on the whole, failed either to rehabilitate the violent juvenile or to reduce the incidence of juvenile crime. A result of this ineffectiveness has been a movement in the state and national legislatures to facilitate transfer of the violent juvenile to the procedures of an adult criminal court, where, even if rehabilitation is not feasible, presumably the penalties are harsher. President Ford recently said:

Too many violent and streetwise juveniles are using their age as a cloak of immunity. Detention may not help the juvenile. But it certainly will help his potential victims. We hear more about the rights of juvenile offenders than about the rights of their victims. Forty-five percent of all violent crime is now perpetrated by juveniles. If they are big enough to commit crimes against society, they are big enough to be punished by society.⁷

Several states have established procedures that enable accused juveniles to be placed within the jurisdiction of adult courts. A recently approved Bill (AB 3121) in California revises existing law to require juveniles charged with specified felonies (e.g., murder, certain arsons, certain robberies, certain rapes, certain kidnappings, certain assaults, and certain discharges of firearms) who were 16 years of age or older at the date of the offense be judged unfit for juvenile proceedings unless it is proved to the court that "such a person would be amenable to juvenile court care and training."⁸ Consideration of the following factors are used to determine if the juvenile is not suited for juvenile treatment:

1. The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor.
2. Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court's jurisdiction.
3. The minor's previous delinquent history, and
4. Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor, and
5. The circumstances and gravity of the offenses alleged to have been committed by the minor.⁹

It seems evident that policymakers, encouraged by a public that is prepared to mass along a hard line on crime, are moving in the direction of punishing the offender primarily on the basis of the seriousness of the offense, even though he may be an adolescent.

⁷ Gerald R. Ford (Speech before the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Miami, Florida, Nov., 1976).

⁸ AB 3121 (The Dixon Bill).

⁹ California Assembly Bill No. 3121 (Julian Dixon, author), 1976.

Increased Reliance on Incapacitation

The most direct means of reducing offenses committed by habitual offenders appears to be an increase in the proportion of offenders who go to prison and a lengthening of the sentences they serve. The rationale for increased reliance on incapacitation is simply that offenders who are incarcerated cannot commit crimes against the community while they are in prison: As Packer states:

So long as we keep a man in prison he will have no opportunity at all to commit certain kinds of crime—burglary, obtaining property by false pretenses, and tax fraud are three of the many types precluded in this way. And his opportunities to commit certain other kinds—such as assault or murder, are greatly diminished by confinement. In a society that was single-mindedly devoted to the repression of crime as a paramount objective of social life, incapacitation would be the most immediately plausible utilitarian justification for the punishment of offenders.¹⁰

There are basically two incapacitation strategies currently being considered—"selective incapacitation" and "collective incapacitation."¹¹ Selective incapacitation involves the imprisonment of particular individuals because of the crimes they are predicted to commit if they were allowed to go free. Their individual criminality is often predicted by taking into account such variables as drugs and employment history, socioeconomic status, and other background variables. The most fundamental critique of this approach is that empirical studies have demonstrated that one's ability to predict future commissions of felonies, especially those of violence, remains distressingly weak.¹² Therefore, inevitably, some will be selected for repressive measures who would not commit serious crimes again. On the other hand, "collective incapacitation" does not rely on individual prediction of future criminal involvement. Under the latter strategy, all offenders convicted of sufficiently serious crimes would be confined, irrespective of the likelihood of their returning to crime. Thus, if *all* convicted criminals are incapacitated for a certain length of time, then there will be a fairly high percentage of recidivists who will be included in this group. This theory has led some to believe that confining all serious criminals for a certain period of time will significantly reduce crime.¹³ As von Hirsch states:

¹⁰ H. Packer, *The Limits of the Criminal Sanction*, Stanford University Press, 1968, p. 47.

¹¹ D. Greenberg, "Where Shimmar and Shimmar went Astray: A Critique of the Effects of the Criminal Justice System on the Control of Crime: A Quantitative Approach," unpublished manuscript, 1976.

¹² See A. von Hirsch, "Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons," *Buffalo Law Review*, 1972, 21, pp. 717-758; and John Monahan, "The Prediction of Violence," *Violence and Criminal Justice*, edited by Duncan Chappell and John Monahan (Lexington Books, 1975), for a review of the prediction of violence in literature.

¹³ J. Q. Wilson, *Thinking About Crime*, New York: Basic Books, 1975; R. Shimmar and S. Shimmar, "The Effects of the Criminal Justice System on the Control of Crime: A Quantitative Approach," *Law and Society Review*, 1975, 9, pp. 581-611.

"If a specified term of confinement is imposed upon persons convicted of a criminal offense, without any attempt at predicting individual dangerousness, that will (by temporarily incapacitating such of those offenders as would otherwise be disposed to commit further offenses) prevent *some* crimes from occurring. The question remains, however, whether the use of imprisonment will prevent a sufficient number of offenses from occurring (considering only its incapacitating effect, and leaving general deterrence aside) to provide the public with a significant degree of net protection against crime. It also might be asked whether the public protection that is achieved is sufficient to warrant the costs and other negative side effects of the institution of imprisonment."¹⁴

In recent years several researchers have offered estimates of the reduction in crime due solely to incapacitation. These estimates, which ignore the impact of deterrence or rehabilitation, vary from a mere five to ten percent increase in crime if current prison use was reduced or eliminated¹⁵ to potential two to five fold decreases in crime if prison use were expanded through higher probabilities of prison for convicted offenders and/or longer times served for those imprisoned.¹⁶ Reuel Shinnar, et al., claim that by incarcerating all serious offenders (those who commit crimes against personal safety) for a period of three years, such serious crime will be reduced by two-thirds.¹⁷ Ehrlich, Clarke, and Greenberg all conclude that incapacitation, as presently administered, has a relatively modest impact on the crime commission rate. We, therefore, have apparently inconsistent estimates of the benefits of incapacitation.

The inconsistencies will certainly continue until several crucial, but still unanswered questions are resolved. The most serious problem that besets persons who attempt to estimate the effect of incapacitation is devising indices which measure the *actual* rate at which persons commit crime. Additionally, we lack data on individual crime rates, viz., how they vary during the criminal career and how they relate to periods of incarceration. Average crime commission rates for all offenders combined have been estimated, using a variety of assumptions. Unfortunately, such estimates are not particularly useful in determining the relative effectiveness of different incapacitation lengths, for offenders convicted of differing offenses.

¹⁴ A. von Hirsch, "Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons," *Buffalo Law Review*, 1972, 21, p. 722.

¹⁵ S. Clarke, "Getting 'Em Out of Circulation: Does Incarceration of Juvenile Offenders Reduce Crime?" *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. 65, No. 4 (1975); D. Greenberg, "The Incapacitative Effect of Imprisonment: Some Estimates," *Law and Society Review*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1975); I. Ehrlich, "The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 65, No. 3 (1975).

¹⁶ J. Marsh and M. Singer, "Soft Statistics and Hard Questions," Discussion Paper HI-1712-DP (1975), Hudson Institute, Quaker Ridge Road, Croton-on-Hudson, New York, 10520; Shinnar and Shinnar (op. cit.).

¹⁷ Shinnar and Shinnar, 1975, p. 589.

If *individual* criminal rates differ significantly from one another, and different people are given different sentences, then the degree of incapacitation will depend upon *who* is incarcerated for *what* period of time. It is the variation in personal criminal rates and the distribution of length of confinement that determine the effectiveness of incapacitation under given policy. Therefore, what is needed is an estimate of the crime commission rate on an individual level to assess the differential effects on a given criminal population of disparate distributions of fixed punishment.

The critical questions raised in determining the effectiveness of incapacitation are: (1) what is the monthly "street time" offense rate for different crime categories, at different points in the offenders' criminal career; (2) what percentage of the total number of offenses committed results in apprehension, conviction, and incarceration; and (3) do all offenders have the same probability of getting arrested, convicted, and incarcerated? If not, what characteristics are associated with the "more or less successful" group?

Understanding the effect that the term of confinement has on the continuation or escalation of the criminal career is another crucial aspect of the incapacitation issue. Increasing sentence length might in some cases simply postpone maturation, or might mainly affect those offenders who are close to natural maturation. If so, then the benefits of the policy might not be substantial. Additionally, the criminogenic effects of incarceration might increase criminality once the offender is released; making incapacitation *counter-productive* to reducing the level of crime.

Lessen Plea Bargaining

A recurrent theme in criminological literature is that the deterrent effect of current sentencing options would be markedly increased if the time to impose sentence is reduced and if there is greater certainty of punishment. A major LEAA program (funded in 1975 at a level of \$6.2 million) is designed to implement that theme for a select group of criminal offenders. This career criminal program enables selected prosecutor's offices to make special efforts against the serious habitual offender. Such career offender prosecutorial units, a major anti-crime initiative of the Ford administration, now operate in 18 cities and plans have been made to double that number in 1977.¹⁸ These units reserve a group of skilled and experienced attorneys with investigative assistance for the sole purpose of successfully prosecuting the career offender. They seek to "seal up the cracks" so that the career criminal beats the system less. Unlike traditional practices, the career criminal units use vertical representation. A single attorney is responsible for prosecuting the defendant from the time the unit accepts the case. He is responsible for filing the appropriate charges

¹⁸ Federally funded career-criminal units are now operating in Houston, New Orleans, Salt Lake City, San Diego, Boston, Detroit, New York, Dallas, Indianapolis, St. Louis, Miami, Las Vegas, Memphis, Louisville, Albuquerque, Portland (Oregon), Columbus, and Kalamazoo, Michigan.

and retains responsibility for all subsequent proceedings. As the head of one unit recently commented:

"No longer will the career criminal case be assigned just by chance to the newest attorney in the office. No longer will he be able to drive a plea bargain with a prosecutor who is not aware of the danger he poses, or his past record, or who is simply too hard-pressed with too many other urgent matters to properly prepare and try the case. No longer can he anticipate endless postponement and rescheduling while witnesses drift away and the file becomes stale. The idea is to put your professional prosecutors—competent, experienced, full-time lawyers—against the professional criminal. When this happens it's no contest. In short, the career criminal can't 'beat the system' anymore, because there really is a system, and it's ready for him."¹⁹

Although the program is relatively new and a final evaluation of the program is not available, the preliminary statistics look promising. The results show that the likelihood of indictment, of conviction, and of a prison sentence have all increased—with the amount of time between indictment and disposition decreasing. So far, 95 percent of the cases have resulted in convictions, compared with a national average conviction rate of 81 percent; and an overwhelming majority of all those convicted under the program have been sentenced to prison, with an average term of nearly 20 years.²⁰

Given the enthusiasm of prosecutors' offices for the program—many cities are initiating such programs on their own, with only local financing—and the generally tougher attitude of the public, such programs seem almost certain to expand rapidly in the coming months.

Mandatory, Determinate Sentences

The disintegration of the rehabilitative ideal has been responsible for the current disenchantment with and proposed elimination of the indeterminate sentence, once considered the ideal way to handle the setting of terms. Prison officials are simply saying that if rehabilitation is the overriding goal, prison is not an appropriate environment. If control (or punishment) is society's first priority, prison can do the job. Wilson and other experts have now accepted the notion that the function of the correctional system is to isolate and to punish—"society really does not know how to do much else."²¹ It followed from this shift that if we abandon rehabilitation as the primary goal, we must also eliminate the indeterminate sentence and its reliance on the parole board's judgment

¹⁹ Richard Thornburgh, LEAA Newsletter, Vol. 6, Nov. 1, 1976.

²⁰ "Why Criminals Go Free: Revolving Door Justice," *U.S. News and World Report*, November 22, 1976.

²¹ James Q. Wilson, *Thinking About Crime*, Basic Books, New York, 1975.

of when a prisoner is sufficiently rehabilitated to be released. Determinate sentencing appears to be the wave of the future—courts will determine the release date at sentencing, probably with allowance for time off for good behavior. It is anticipated that in adopting determinate sentencing the disparity in sentences and time served will be reduced. Previously, under an indeterminate sentence, it was possible for a less serious offender to be imprisoned longer than a hard-core habitual offender convicted of a similar crime, if paroling authorities opined the latter to be "rehabilitated" earlier. In California, the new determinate sentence law may result in a longer sentence for the habitual offender. The California law provides for an additional term of one year to be served for each prior prison term, and three years for each violent felony prior.²²

Consistent with the new hard-line approach is a call for mandatory sentences as a cure for what some believed to be leniency in the courts of the 1960's. Certainty of sentence has become a principle that virtually every expert in the field now believes should be incorporated in the sentencing structure. President Ford in his recent message to Congress endorsed the mandatory sentence scheme, although he cautioned ". . . mandatory sentences need not be long sentences . . ." ²³ The Illinois Law Enforcement Commission recently recommended a mandatory sentence proposal, modeled after the justice model of David Fogel. Under the plan, everyone convicted of a similar offense would receive a similar sentence. At the time of sentencing, the total could be reduced or increased by the judge because of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. But apart from that adjustment, a given sentence would be mandatory. Says Commission Director David Fogel: "Justice requires that everything be clear-cut." Ohio's Attorney General, William J. Brown, conveyed what has become a popular sentiment regarding the benefits derived from the use of mandatory sentences:

"I am firmly convinced that the mandatory-type penalty structure will actually deter crimes of intent . . . We're talking about the first offender, first crack at crime, you go right to the can. Pure and simple. . . he knows that if he gets caught he's going to jail . . . And nobody's going to help him. The parole board can't help him, the judge can't help him, his priest can't help him. That's the frame of mind we want the criminal to be in. So that when he commits a crime, he knows that he's going to get.

. . . What we're trying to do is this: Make sure that the criminal who stands before the judge knows that the judge doesn't have any discretion . . .

. . . The guy who uses a gun should be put in jail . . . forever. That's how I feel. I think that anyone who wants to use

²² California State Penal Code, Section 667.5. Additionally, a five-year wash-out is provided for most priors (ten years for violent felony priors).

²³ President Ford, Message to Congress, June 19, 1975.

a gun in the commission of a crime, goes. That's all . . . and he stays. Forever and ever and ever . . . That's the only way you're going to be able to solve the crime problem. It's going to be tough. It's going to be tough on people. You're going to put a guy in jail for fifty years. It's a hell of a burden on the taxpayers. But I think that in five years' time when the state has about half the crime it had before, the taxpayers will be willing to bear that burden. Get those guys off the street" ²⁴

It remains to be seen whether the state legislators will adopt such strict measures as those suggested by Attorney General Brown, but modified versions of mandatory sentencing schemes certainly appear to be on the horizon.

Voluntary Rehabilitation

After the expenditure of billions of dollars and years of effort, most experts now agree that institutions cannot rehabilitate criminals. Study after study has shown that no correctional treatment has had a significant effect in lowering the prison return rate.²⁵ If we acknowledge that rehabilitation is a "myth," it does not follow logically that an inmate should be required to participate in such programs prior to institutional release. Several respected experts, including Norval Morris,²⁶ David Fogel,²⁷ and Norman Carlson²⁸ have recently called for the abolition of mandatory or coerced rehabilitative efforts. Federal Director of Prisons Carlson recently announced that he has abandoned the goal of trying to rehabilitate prisoners and urged criminal justice personnel to admit that the real purpose of prison is punishment and deterrence. In federal prisons, rehabilitation programs will be offered only on a voluntary basis: and furthermore, a prisoner's progress at rehabilitation will have no bearing on his release date. The elimination of forced participation of inmates in treatment programs should result in improved receptivity on the part of those inmates who choose to participate. Resources will be saved by not treating unresponsive inmates, and the new policy should eliminate the incentive for inmates to feign cooperation with the treators in order to facilitate their release. Currently, parole boards release a prisoner when they decide he's been "rehabilitated." Prisoners, after repeated contacts with the system, learn to "act" rehabilitated; and, as Hans Mattick recently noted, "The prisons have become largely drama schools which force people to act as if they were rehabilitated along stereotyped conventions."²⁹ New legislation already adopted in California and Maine separate rehabilitation programs from an inmate's release date.

²⁴ *The Compass* (Ohio Committee on Crime and Delinquency of the Ohio Citizens Council, July 1975), "Mandatory Sentences: Two Views," p. 1.

²⁵ Robinson, J., and G. Smith, "The Effectiveness of Correctional Programs," *Crime and Delinquency*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1971; R. Martinson, "What Works?—Questions and Answers about Prison Reform," *The Public Interest*, No. 35, 1974; D. Lipton, R. Martinson, and J. Wilks, *The Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment: A Survey of Treatment Evaluation Studies*, New York: Praeger.

²⁶ N. Morris, *The Future of Imprisonment*, University of Chicago Press, 1974.

²⁷ D. Fogel, *We are the Living Proof*, 1976.

²⁸ Norman A. Carlson, "Danger Ahead in Get-Tough Policy," *Los Angeles Times*, May 25, 1975.

²⁹ "The Crime Wage," *Time*, June 30, 1975, p. 22.

Increase Police Surveillance

Police agencies, and, to a lesser extent, paroling authorities, have been initiating specialized surveillance programs in response to the growing habitual offender problem. It has been suggested that the detection of an individual's return to criminal activity be made more likely by concentrating efforts of police agents on surveillance of known offenders. If, as most persons believe, "most crime . . . is the work of a limited number of hardened criminals,"³⁰ then there is a need to develop improved methods for identifying the more serious suspects. Instead of relying upon reported crimes to identify offenders, police have begun to act proactively. Whereas the traditional, police model emphasized the crime deterrence effect of high visibility, new proactive patrols emphasize low visibility, and concentrate on apprehending criminals during the commission of felonies. Robert Martinson suggested a "cop-on-con" program which would assign police officers to watch individual parolees, the sole purpose being to apprehend the offender in the act of committing another crime. Although his approach may not be practical nor even appropriate, some police departments today are moving in similar directions. Police departments across the country are more frequently allocating resources to proactive or apprehension-oriented patrols. Units such as these often "tail" known major offenders. Not surprisingly, these units can be quite costly and their utility has not been documented.

A recent experiment was conducted by the Kansas City Police Department to test the effectiveness of Perpetrator-Oriented Patrols (POP).³¹ The underlying philosophy of POP was that certain individuals suspected of being criminals warranted surveillance by the police. Similar programs emphasizing individuals rather than crime incidents have been instituted in other major cities in the United States.³² While results varied, POP was superior to the regular patrol strategy on most criteria. The criteria included were arrest effectiveness, arrest disposition, "removal" effectiveness, and officer-citizen conflict. However, POP did not prove more effective than the Location-Oriented Patrol (surveillance of areas with particularly high crime rates). The authors of the report cautioned that specialized apprehension strategies have the effect of diverting usually scarce resources from generalized functions to specialized ones, and incur unusual expenses for equipment. These costs also must be weighed carefully against the need for such specialized approaches, and provision made for the increased officer-citizen conflict that seems naturally to evolve from these proactive strategies.

³⁰ President Gerald Ford (Speech at the Dept. of Justice, Oct. 4, 1976).

³¹ Tony Pate, Robert A. Bowers, and Ron Parks, *Three Approaches to Criminal Apprehension in Kansas City: An Evaluation Report*, Police Foundation, 1976.

³² See Greenwood and Petersilia, *The Criminal Investigation Process, Volume I: Summary and Policy Implications*, The Rand Corporation, R-1776-DOJ, October 1975, for further examples.

Concluding Note

It appears that the various factions—police, courts, and correctional agencies—are responding to the public's hardening views, to evidence of system ineffectiveness, and to the belief that the rising violent crime rate appears to be the result of the activities of a few hardened, habitual offenders. Each system component is reallocating resources into programs intended to identify the habitual offender, prosecute him expeditiously, and sentence him appropriately. We can expect to witness emphasis being placed on the crime rather than the criminal, irrespective of the offender's age. Sentences are likely to become mandatory, determinate, and longer for the habitual offender. The rehabilitative ideal will wither, giving way to voluntary programs of treatment. Finally, policing agencies will turn away from total reliance upon reactive patrol to community surveillance and proactive patrols, which concentrate specifically on detecting the repeat offender's return to crime.

In the next few years the criminal justice system will be redirecting its efforts in substantial ways. Important new policies having long-term impacts are certain to be adopted. These innovations should be viewed with, at best, guarded optimism, for they have not been prompted by empirical evidence that they will be clearly advantageous. Rather, they are the product mostly of disappointment in present policies.

Our uncertain expectations about imminent reforms underscore a need for broad and meticulous research on their effects. Indeed, such ongoing research is required to disclose the actual degree to which the new laws, policies, and rules are being implemented; to clarify the differential effects on the various components of the criminal justice system; and to separate the productive from the counterproductive reforms. Such research should provide a foundation for constructive criminal justice changes in the future.

Ms. Petersilia recently started a major piece of research focusing on the criminal career of the repetitively violent offender. She has published several research reports on the effectiveness of community correctional programs and authored a number of articles relating to the criminal investigation function. Ms. Petersilia is a co-author of *The Criminal Investigation Process* (D. C. Heath, 1977). Her principal professional interests focus on utilizing research to guide the policy maker in reforming the criminal justice system so that it can deal more effectively with the habitual offender.

'I THOUGHT THIS WAS A VOLUNTARY PROGRAM'¹

BY LOYD WOLFE

Mr. Wolfe is an administrative assistant to the superintendent at the Youth Authority's Youth Training School

This is a story with a happy ending—a dialogue between a ward who is wondering whether to participate in the Youth Training School's Voluntary Program and a staff member who tries to explain. And in following the dialogue, the reader learns quite a bit himself about the program—an innovative approach to deal with many problems encountered in an institution.

JOE BLOE: "Sign a contract! What kind of a sucker do you think I am anyway? I'm just here to do my time. Man, don't put a contract on me!"

**FEARLESS FRED:
Youth Counselor** "Wait a minute, Joe, let me explain again. The new program here at Youth Training School gives each of you a choice of program levels. We call them Phases. YTS has four Phases: Phase A, B, C, and D. Each of these Phases has written criteria for your performance and your rewards. These criteria are written as a contract form which both you and our staff sign."

JOE: "Yeah, but to call it a 'contract' sounds so 'heavy' . . ."

FEARLESS: "Yes, it does sound sorta legal. It is a written document which spells out performance—for both you and for staff. It is an attempt to make sure that you *do* what you say you will do."

JOE: "Say . . . ah . . . what happens if I don't do everything the contract says?"

FEARLESS: "Then you have broken the contract and you lose the benefits which were written on that contract."

JOE: "What do you mean . . . ?"

¹ "Voluntary Program" is the name of the overall program which was developed under the leadership of Superintendent Keith E. Vermillion, by wards and staff. It began partial operation Jan. 1, 1976, started 4 Phases in March 1976, and received full staffing and had full program operations after July 1, 1976.

FEARLESS: "O.K., look at this Phase D contract. It states that you agree to (1) attend your assignment (school/trade) for six hours; (2) that you attend small group counseling; (3) that you get no more than 2 level A or 1 level B Behavior Reports in a 90-day period.

Now, in return for this good program, you will receive (1) an evening program until 11 p.m. every night; (2) you will receive two day passes per month (after you qualify); (3) you will receive a time-cut recommendation to Board for 9 days per month off your continuance. . . . How does that sound?"

JOE: "What's the catch?"

FEARLESS: "The catch is that you don't get the goodies until you do the work!"

JOE: "Oh; . . . Well, what happens if I don't do the work?"

FEARLESS: "If you don't perform up to the level you agreed to, you have broken the Phase D contract, and you must be moved to a lower level. For example, a Phase C contract requires that you (1) attend your assignment for 4-5 hours daily; (2) that you attend small group counseling; and (3) that you receive no more than 3 level A or 1 level B Behavior Reports per 90 days. Then, in turn, you will receive (1) an evening program until 10 p.m. each night; (2) two day passes per month; and (3) a time-cut recommendation for 6 days per month off your continuance."

JOE: "That one isn't quite as good . . ."

FEARLESS: "You're right, and the same pattern follows for Phase B. It requires (1) that you go to your assignment for only 3 hours; (2) that you attend small group counseling; and (3) that you receive no more than 4 level A or 1 level B Behavior Reports in 90 days. In turn, you will receive only (1) an evening program until 9:30 p.m. each night; (2) one day pass per month; and (3) a time-cut recommendation for three days per month off your continuance."

JOE: "You keep talking about time cuts. Can you guarantee it?"

FEARLESS: "No, because the Board does not work for us. It works for the society at large, but it has committed itself to work *with* us. The Board likes our program of expecting wards

to earn their time cuts, so they said that they will support our recommendation as much as they can."

JOE: "What about Phase A?"

FEARLESS: "Phase A is essentially 'no program' and 'no time cut'. You spend the time in your room while others are going to trade and school. You may either *choose* to go to Phase A, or you may *be placed* in Phase A for failure to live up to specific things in your contract. If your Phase A behavior is good, then you can choose any other phase at the end of 30 days."

JOE: "You mean at the end of 30 days good time I can sign a new Phase D contract?"

FEARLESS: "Right. You've paid your debts, so after 30 days in Phase A, you can start earning again in another Phase."

JOE: "Let's see, in Phase D I earn 9 days a month for my first nine months here, so I'll get 81 days off my year's continuance—right?"

FEARLESS: "My, your math has improved already! You're right, you'll have earned about $2\frac{1}{2}$ month's time-cut recommendation."

JOE: "Wait a minute, are you suggesting that contracts replace 'write-up'?"

FEARLESS: "No. Any misbehavior is still documented on a Behavior Report and subject to DDMS action. It will be investigated, have a hearing, go to disposition, and you can appeal it. So be careful; if you 'mess up', you can get a time add as well."

JOE: "If I get a time add, do I lose my time cut?"

FEARLESS: "Well, you get to keep both. The time cut is like earning money in the bank and can be used to get out earlier; however, if you get a three-month's time add, then you have to add this onto your time."

JOE: "What if I beat the case at the appeal level, do I get my 9 days back?"

FEARLESS: "Yes. If you were placed on Phase A because your actions broke your contract, and you were able to get the DDMS action reversed, then yes, you will get back your 9 days recommended time cut."

JOE: "O.K., you seem to be telling me a straight story, so I might even be willing to sign a contract . . ."

FEARLESS: "Wait. Before you rush into this, I have a question for you. How's your reading score?"

JOE: "Wait a minute, now you're getting personal!"

FEARLESS: "Yes, we try to be personal here in Orientation—even about such touchy issues like one's reading score. You took some tests at the Clinic which show you didn't read quite up to 4.8 grade level."

JOE: "So, what does that mean?"

FEARLESS: "For one thing, it means you can't get into vocational training until you can read and do math at or above the 4.8 grade level."

JOE: "Hey, I want to go into welding. What does reading have to do with using a torch?"

FEARLESS: "Our point here is that you need to read instructions on a job; you also need to read in order to fill out a job application or even to understand the daily newspaper. So, if you really want to get into welding, then you must first go to the Remedial class and bring up your scores; and then you may request the Welding Shop."

JOE: "I thought you guys call this the 'Voluntary Program'!"

FEARLESS: "It is. You may choose to participate in the program and earn your time cut, or you can choose to do nothing, for which you will also get nothing."

JOE: "O.K., O.K., you made your point."

FEARLESS: "Are you ready to sign a contract?"

JOE: "Yeah, I'll sign a Phase D contract, but you guys had better give me everything I earn!"

FEARLESS: "We will live up to our end of the contract, and at the same time, we'll expect you to do your best to live up to your end of the contract!"

JOE: "O.K., where do I sign?"

GOOD GRIEVANCE! IS THIS PROCEDURE APPEALING?

BY MICHAEL MARGOSIAN AND HEATHER SCOTT CISSNA

Mr. Margosian and Ms. Cissna are law students and assistants in the Department's Ward Rights Section who have edited a revised edition of the Youth Authority's ward rights handbook.

Two law students relatively new to the Youth Authority take a fresh look at the Ward Grievance Procedure and find it a process that is proving its worth.

"Clearly, the correctional client has historically adopted a thermometer-like posture rather than a thermostatic one. In other words, he is constantly being acted upon rather than acting himself in an attempt to change or modify his institutional environment. But, this thermometer-like posture is rapidly giving way to a more active thermostatic image under the prodding of and encouragement of the judiciary." ("Correctional Manpower —Are We The Society of Captives?" Charles S Prigmore, Ph.D., and John C. Watkins, Jr. Fed. Prob. Dec. 1972)

The trend described by Prigmore and Watkins can be seen in the Youth Authority, as wards constantly challenge the rules, regulations and policies which determine their institutional situations. The controversial mechanism which provides for the continuing dialogue among staff, wards and administrators—the Ward Grievance Procedure—has now been codified into state law.

Although the Ward Grievance Procedure (WGP) has received much favorable attention from the outside, being chosen as an "exemplary project" by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and approved into law by the Legislature, some people within the Youth Authority remain unconvinced that it is a valuable addition to the institutional environment.

We hope to show that the process involved is one which can, and should be supported by all members of the correctional community, without regard to philosophical differences. Those who follow the justice model of corrections will find that the WGP satisfies the requirements of that framework. Likewise, those who espouse treatment and rehabilitation theories will find within the WGP many features congruent with the aims of those theories.

Historical attitudes toward ward rights will be examined here, because in many cases these attitudes still exist, despite great changes in youth

correctional populations and institutions. Legal, practical and theoretical justifications for the use of the WGP will be presented in an attempt to show that the additional efforts required to successfully implement this mechanism are well worth the benefits to the wards, the Youth Authority, and society at large.

One of the most well-meaning but least defensible attitudes held by those who disagree with the concept of the WGP is that staff and administrators will protect the rights and interests of the wards without a formalized grievance procedure. The paternalistic attitude that "We know what's best for them" has very often been shown to be incorrect. And, although in many instances staff and administrators are possessed of greater wisdom, paternalism often prompts unnecessary negative responses, hampering treatment efforts and creating additional conflict.

When American penal reformers pressed for the separation of juveniles from the adult courts and correctional institutions, they argued that deviant juveniles should not be treated as criminals, but rather as victims of lack of parental supervision and guidance. In a humane effort to save children as young as 5 from the horrors of adult prisons, reformers called for the substitution of the state as parent. To this day, juveniles are "committed" for "offenses" rather than being "convicted" of "crimes."

Unfortunately, the state often proved a harsh parent when it stepped into the lives of many juveniles under the *parens patriae*, or "state as parent" doctrine. Conditions in juvenile institutions were often as miserable as those in adult prisons. Yet, because juveniles were judged to be under the protective arm of the state, they were not afforded the constitutional protections provided to adults in the arrest, sentencing and appeals processes.

Court Backgrounds

The Supreme Court, in 1966, recognized that the protective paternalistic attitude taken toward juveniles had not been to their benefit, but instead had deprived them of basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In situations of less than constitutional dimensions, paternalistic attitudes aggravate the conflict inherent in the largely one-sided decision-making process of institutional life. The Supreme Court in *In Re Gault*¹ cited observations by sociologists Wheeler and Cottrell that "when the procedural laxness of *parens patriae* is followed by stern disciplining, the contrast may have an adverse effect on the child, who feels that he has been deceived or enticed."

The WGP serves not merely to prevent abuses of rights, but to alleviate conflicts which arise when wards feel powerless over decisions which affect them. It is an important aspect of the WGP that unfair situations be corrected. However, it is perhaps even more important that the WGP allows wards to have some input into the decision-making process. The tension and frustration caused by top-down management decisions, im-

¹ *In Re Gault* (1967) U.S.I.

posed on lower-level personnel without an opportunity for input or feedback, has been experienced by most employees. These feelings of resentment are intensified in the correctional setting, where almost every action is dictated by others. The WGP helps to circumvent the tension and frustration which often lead to conflict, and sometimes to violence. No matter how fair in fact, a decision-making process without input could not accomplish this.

Some administrators and staff object to the proliferation of mechanisms which stress the rights of wards, and encourage them to express dissatisfaction, without simultaneously stressing concommitant responsibilities. In addition to the point that the exercise of rights in society many times does not depend on adequate acceptance of responsibilities, there is a more practical argument for the use of the WGP despite its lack of stress on responsibilities per se. There is evidence that the WGP may be a good vehicle for helping wards to deal with concepts of law and morality which underlie the idea of personal responsibility.

Social researcher Peter Scharf has found that although offenders "have often failed to develop an ability to see the rationale of law from society's point of view", traditional institutions "fail to provide an environment likely to facilitate mature legal thought."² Thus, wards may well be institutionalized because of their lack of understanding of the concept of responsibility. Admonitions about responsibility will fall upon deaf ears until a mechanism is provided to stimulate an understanding of the con-

The WGP, while providing a means to rectify unfair situations and allowing for input about decisions, also creates an environment where wards can develop socio-moral reasoning. Adolescence has been found to be the period when a person's ability to deal with moral questions related to larger social issues is at a peak, before moral reasoning stabilizes at about age 25. The Constitutional Rights Foundation, which develops curricula for promoting legal and political socialization in schools, has found that when young people are involved on both motoric and intellectual levels, understanding of concepts occurs, but that when facts are merely transmitted from teacher to students, learning often does not take place. Classroom instruction has been found to have "little effect upon the structure of moral or legal thought." (Hartshorne and May, in Scharf, 1976.)

On the other hand, where open dialogue, participation, moral conflict and democratic interaction are encouraged, socio-legal and moral development is rapid. By incorporating these features into the institutional environment, the WGP gives wards a chance to grapple firsthand with a large responsibility, that of working within a system to effect change. Wards will be more likely to accept responsibility for their actions when they perceive the community to be fair, the rules to be legitimate, and their stake in the outcome to be worthwhile, than when rules are seen merely as limits on what the authorities will tolerate and responsibilities are seen as invalid requirements of an arbitrary system.

² Scharf and Hickey, "Conception of Legal Justice", *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, Vol. 3, No. 2, June, 1976.

Growth Exercise

For those whose correctional goals are treatment-oriented, and whose aim is to decrease recidivism through effecting changes within the ward, the WGP can be looked at as another growth exercise through which the ward can learn how to deal with the outside world, and with his or her responsibilities to others. While treatment-oriented personnel may tend to concentrate upon conflicts between individuals as a function of their psychological traits, growth in the area of socio-legal and moral reasoning requires ability to deal with systems and concepts which transcend these interpersonal interactions. Although the WGP provides for the use of a system to resolve problems, it does so in such a way that treatment concepts, such as the goal of the adult-adult relationship of transactional analysis, can be an integral part of the experience of using the procedure.

Aside from the goals of treatment and rehabilitation, the use of the WGP can be justified on purely ethical grounds. Those who accept the justice model of correctional thought will find that the WGP emphasizes similar goals: fairness of treatment, input into the decision-making process and an environment free from arbitrariness.

In a more practical, less philosophical sense, the WGP merits the support of staff and administrators. The historical "hands off" attitude of the judiciary toward the correctional system has yielded in recent years to increased intervention. According to William Toal, "resolution of inmate grievances in a swift, effective manner is a major goal of both inmates and prison officials, but grievance resolution by court decision is slow, time-consuming and often unsatisfactory to both groups. While the courts must remain the final arbiter of matters of constitutional importance, alternatives to the lengthy court process are desirable since prolonging a controversy is beneficial to neither inmates nor prison officials. Administrators are seeking suitable alternatives and the courts are providing encouragement."³

When correctional personnel take the initiative to develop and implement internal methods of grievance resolution, they retain self-determination over the administration of change. Although it is obvious that the courts will remain watchful over progress in the area of prisoners' rights, it is also clear that the judiciary both welcome and expect significant input from those intimately involved in the correctional scene.

At this point correctional personnel have the opportunity to preclude the imposition of court-mandated solutions by providing a due process mechanism which works to resolve grievances not only in theory, but more importantly, in practice.

In addition, internal grievance resolution results in great savings of time, money and energy by reducing the need for correctional personnel to respond in court about issues raised by prisoners' requests for writs of habeas corpus. In addition, the already overburdened court system is

³ Toal, *Recent Developments in Correctional Case Law*, South Carolina Department of Corrections, 1975.

relieved of the flood of prisoners' requests, many of which involve problems more efficiently resolved within the institutions themselves.

Finally, we might look at the need for the WGP as an extension of changes occurring in the world outside the institutions. By affirming the principles of the WGP, we also affirm our beliefs in mechanisms which challenge other traditions no longer suitable in today's world.

In recent years, citizens, as consumers and workers, have begun to press for their rights to redress for unfair situations. Response to this pressure has been slow, but today citizens have methods by which they can voice their complaints and thus change previously inflexible situations. The California Department of Consumer Affairs actively encourages a consumer to first attempt an informal resolution of the problem with the seller or producer of a defective product. However, we all know how little leverage we have when we hold defective goods and the merchant has the money. Now, if no solution is agreed upon, the consumer may file a complaint, like a grievance, stating the problem and requesting a certain resolution. Prior to this procedure, the consumer was stuck—the doctrine of *caveat emptor*, "let the buyer beware", left the consumer without redress.

Another system with similar goals is the Employee Grievance Procedure. We can understand the importance of complete support for the WGP and its principles of non-retaliation if we consider the consequences of filing an employee grievance. In order for mechanisms like these to work, the grievants must feel comfortable that the cure will not be worse than the disease—in other words, that the consequences of filing a grievance will not be worse than enduring the present situation.

If the WGP continues to gain the increased support of personnel and wards, many interests will be served. The benefits of the procedure go not only to the wards, who receive the protection of due process in their daily lives, but also to the personnel involved and to the society as a whole. The reduction of violence-causing tension, the increase in socio-moral reasoning, the heightened awareness of operating within a legitimate system to cause change, and the savings of a more efficient mechanism are benefits which should not be underestimated. The WGP deserves the wholehearted support of everyone involved with the Youth Authority.

HOW SCHOOLS CONTRIBUTE TO DELINQUENCY

BY GORDON L. SPENCER

Mr. Spencer is supervisor of academic instruction at the Youth Authority's Karl Holton School

There is no question that youthful offenders are failures in their communities and in their schools. But are the public schools themselves contributing the delinquency by the way they handle troubled and troublesome youth?

For a number of years correctional educators have felt, because of the educational and other characteristics of incarcerated delinquent youth, that schools sometimes contribute to delinquency. There are a number of these characteristics and several contributing school practices.

Delinquents received at correctional schools exhibit characteristics which indicate that they are products of many failures, sometimes including the failure of the school. These youth:

1. Are frequently school drop-outs.
2. Are educationally retarded 4 to 5 years, on the average.
3. Have frequently been chronic truants.
4. Have usually been behavior problems in school.
5. Have usually failed in school.
6. Typically, have an intense dislike for school.
7. Usually have poor self-images.
8. Are seen as failures by their teachers and families.

Thus it appears that schools have had some negative effects on these young people.¹

This paper will discuss how schools can contribute to delinquency by failing to prepare students for today's world, and how certain attitudes and actions of school personnel can also contribute to the problem.

Schools sometimes fail to prepare students for today's world and thus contribute to delinquency. They provide frustrating experiences for some students, they sometimes fail to maintain the interest of students, they sometimes fail to present the school as a model of the pluralistic society in which we live, and they sometimes fail to prepare students for mature life.

¹ Frank Dell'Apia, *Issues in Education for the Youthful Offender in Correctional Institutions* (Boulder, Colorado: Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 1974), p. 2.

Some schools seem to insist upon teaching subjects in which many students cannot succeed. This often damages self-confidence, leads to failure, leads to rejection by teachers and classmates, and tends to push the student a step toward becoming a delinquent.²

If a student experiences frequent failure in class he becomes frustrated and unhappy. This can lead to additional failure, acting-out against school and delinquency. He wonders why he is in school and what good it is going to do him.³

The typical delinquent has a very poor self-image and almost a total lack of confidence in his ability to improve his situation. One reason for this is school failure. According to Glasser, "If school failure did not exist other handicaps could be overcome."⁴

Curricula must provide a reasonable opportunity for every student to succeed in some areas. If they fail to do this they can be contributing to delinquency.⁵

Failure to Maintain Student Interest

To the delinquent, the learning process often seems unreal. He often loses interest because he sees no relation between what he learns and life as he knows it. Schools frequently fail to relate school work to the real outside world. As Haskell and Yablonski state:

School experience irrelevant to life experience and employment opportunities, and not relating to the needs and aspirations of the student, leave him uninvolved and contributes heavily to dropout rates. An unemployed dropout stands a good chance of becoming a delinquent.⁶

The failure of some schools to develop curricula specifically of interest and relevance to students also contributes to student boredom. Boredom tends to lead to discipline problems, acting-out, and delinquency.⁷

Many schools tend to isolate and exclude. Groups are separated for various curricular reasons. A school which does this denies its students a meaningful opportunity to interact with diverse segments of society. Without this interaction youth have difficulty learning how to effectively relate with others. As Stratton and Terry state, "Delinquency can be defined, in part, as the inability to generalize the effects of one's own behavior on others."⁸

² Milton L. Barron, *The Juvenile Delinquent in Society* (New York: Knopf, 1960), p. 177.

³ Trumbull W. Kelly, "Preface," *California Youth Authority Quarterly*, 18 (Spring, 1968), 2.

⁴ William Glasser, *Schools Without Failure* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 3-4.

⁵ William R. Haskell and Lewis Yablonski, *Crime and Delinquency* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1970), p. 303; see also Glasser, pp. 1-5.

⁶ John R. Stratton and Robert M. Terry, *Prevention of Delinquency* (London: The Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 200; see also Haskell and Yablonski, pp. 302-3.

⁷ Haskell and Yablonski, p. 303; see also *Los Angeles County Grand Jury Report, 1972*, p. 17.

⁸ Stratton and Terry, p. 200.

Many schools do not allow students the opportunity to exercise self-responsibility or decision-making. A school which denies these opportunities for all students denies them an opportunity to develop mature behavior. As Stratton and Terry contend, "Delinquency can be described as a dramatic manifestation of immature behavior."⁹

School personnel sometimes contribute to delinquency through their negative actions toward, and interactions with, students. They also sometimes contribute to the problem through their attitudes toward it.

An important contribution to delinquency is the negative interaction of some students with teachers and school officials. Studies show a positive relationship between delinquency and poor attitudes toward school and school personnel. Because of these negative interactions youth frequently turn to the delinquent subculture for acceptance, recognition and protection.¹⁰ These negative interactions include harsh disciplinary practices and a lack of concern and compassion by some teachers and administrators.¹¹

The traditional response of many school officials to disruptive school behavior is to suspend or expel. Arbitrary and discriminatory suspensions and expulsions without opportunity to answer or explain charges against them, especially when others are not disciplined for the same behavior, contribute to the students' negative attitudes toward school, and encourages them to seek out the delinquent subculture. As Senator Birch Bayh says, "Expulsive disciplinary practices appear to be a contributing factor to delinquency."¹²

School personnel sometime employ arbitrary rules, oppressive control techniques, and they often lack concern for young people in school. As a result, many youngsters feel that most teachers and administrators don't care about them. This compounds the frustrations and conflicts which the delinquent-prone student is already experiencing, and can drive him further toward full-fledged delinquency.¹³

Many school officials are convinced that delinquency and delinquency-proneness are products of low socioeconomic status. With this view in mind many of them seem to close their eyes to the role which the school can play in the delinquency process. Thus, they take no action to correct the contributing factors existing in the school. In this way they, themselves, contribute to the delinquency problem.¹⁴

⁹ Stratton and Terry, p. 200.

¹⁰ Joseph Senna and others, "Delinquent Behavior and Academic Investment Among Suburban Youth," *Adolescence*, IX (Winter, 1974), 481-82.

¹¹ "Violence in the Schools: Everybody Has Solutions," *The American School Board Journal*, 162 (January, 1975), 35.

¹² Birch Bayh, *Our Nation's Schools—A Report Card: "A" in School Violence and Vandalism*, U.S., Educational Resources Information Center, ERIC Document ED 104 006, 1975.

¹³ "Violence in the Schools: Everybody Has Solutions," op. cit., 35.

¹⁴ Roger Woodbury and Charles M. Achilles, "Schools and Delinquency: Where are We Going Now?" *NASSP Bulletin*, 59 (January, 1975), 32.

Conclusion

There are a variety of contributors to the problem of delinquency. The school can be one of them. If progress is to be made in the fight against delinquency, educators need to recognize that school can contribute to the problem. With this understanding, they must work diligently to correct those conditions in the schools which contribute to one of the most serious problems facing our nation today.

Education can effectively prevent delinquency or contribute to it. Quality education reduces social problems, including delinquency, but school failure contributes to delinquency.¹⁵

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¹⁵ Stephen J. Knezevich, *Administration of Public Education* (3rd ed.; New York: Harper and Row, 1975), pp. 542-59; see also Herman G. Stark, "The Importance of Education," *California Youth Authority Quarterly*, 18 (Spring, 1965), 1.

OUT OF THE SAND TRAP WITH CRISIS INTERVENTION¹

BY WAYNE RIGGS

Mr. Riggs, a senior youth counselor at the Youth Authority's Youth Training School, is an instructor in crisis intervention training

Violence and injuries in a correctional institution often can be avoided if staff can be trained in ways of intervening effectively before trouble gets out of hand. The Youth Authority has embarked in a comprehensive program of crisis intervention training statewide.

"Crisis Intervention is the best training I have ever received." This statement seems to be the consensus of the staff who have taken Crisis Intervention. The classes began late in 1976 and are being held at all the Youth Authority Schools. As one can readily see, there is a heavy commitment on the part of the department to train all staff in Crisis Intervention.

For readers who have not had any exposure to Crisis Intervention, I would like to explain what it is. Crisis Intervention is a specific procedure to deal with disputes. This specificity is where this instruction differs from other Y.A. training. Crisis Intervention's purpose is to work through disputes in a safe and systematic way.

For example, take a golf bag full of clubs. Each club has a specific function. There are woods for distance and irons for accuracy. There is a putter for the greens, and a sand wedge for when the golfer finds himself in trouble in the bunkers or sand traps. A golfer may be only as good as his selection of clubs. Crisis Intervention, metaphorically speaking, is like a sand wedge. The situation calls for the procedure. Just as the golfer uses the wedge when he is in trouble in the sand, we use Crisis Intervention when we are in trouble with a hassle or dispute occurring. The wedge or Crisis Intervention procedure is kept in the bag until needed. The golfer never forgets his other clubs, just as the staff should never forget their other skills. As we tell our class on the first day, Crisis Intervention is not a substitute for their obtained skills as they enter the class, but a supplement, an extra tool, a sand wedge. In a dispute they will use Crisis Intervention, a specific procedure for a specific problem, disputes.

Crisis Intervention is taught as a 40-hour training session. There are eight different curricula. They are safety, defusing, brief interviewing, mediation, referral, culture, legal and consolidation. The procedure is

¹ In early 1977, there were 12 Crisis Intervention instructors training staff for the Youth Authority. Three of the instructors work out of the Youth Training School in Chino. They are James McDuffy, Si Mariano, and the author of this article, Wayne Riggs. These particular instructors have trained over 150 staff so far in Crisis Intervention. The staff being trained are staff working inside the institution. They include security staff, teachers, counselors, social workers, parole agents, cooks, maintenance personnel and administrators. Reaction to the training has been extremely positive. Several other agencies hearing of the training have begun to inquire about the possibility of training their staff.

taught as it is used, in building blocks of instruction. The procedure must remain in order if it is to work. In other words, one cannot go into mediation before brief interview, and cannot do a brief interview without defusing first. It is systematic with one step leading into another.

Since the procedure is explicit, one would simply "plug" the problem into the system. In this way one works through the dispute with the two or more disputants. Emphasis is placed on safety throughout the procedure. Therefore, the system emphasizes the safest approach for both staff and wards. During the training we teach the procedure step by step. We break down disputes into their elements and the forces operating. The students learn to assess the dispute and where to "plug" into it. It is a skill and must be practiced in order to become proficient.

Need For Training

There is a definite need for this kind of training. Much of staff's time is spent in dealing with disputes. We have all been at the mercy of our instincts and luck, since there has never been any training in how to handle disputes. "Flying by the seat of our pants" is not the safest, most reliable method to use. In the past, without the Crisis Intervention procedure, disputes and arguments would quickly escalate into injuries to both staff and wards. What began as an argument between two people many times exploded into group confrontations. With Crisis Intervention, these disputes would have been handled quickly, thus eliminating the potential for escalation.

A staff member using Crisis Intervention approaches two wards about to fight. His first job is to assess the danger level, using backup if necessary. This assessment is one of the many issues discussed in the safety section. Keeping safety always foremost in his mind, the staff member uses defusing techniques to calm the wards down, thus restoring order. By using defusing techniques, he now has the attention of the wards without jeopardizing his own safety.

The staff member has control of the situation, has the wards seated, and is now beginning Brief Interviewing. Brief Interviewing is an effective and efficient technique for gathering information. Numerous issues and problems face the staff person as he attempts to gather clean information (clean information being that information without his biases and opinions). However, the Crisis Intervention training has made the staff member aware of the numerous pitfalls and how to avoid them, along with using tools to assist him in gathering the information.

Once the staff member has collected the information and comes to an agreement on the nature of the problem, he now, and only now, can make a decision on the disposition of the problem. We call this point in the procedure, the decision point. The staff must make a decision on how he will choose to resolve it. He may lock the wards up, write behavior reports, counsel, or choose to do nothing. These were the only options available to him before Crisis Intervention. We show him two more. These additional options are mediation and referral.

Mediation is the process in the Crisis Intervention procedure which allows the *wards* to resolve their own problems with our minimal assistance. The wards will reach an agreement on a course of action which will settle the dispute. This is much different than the staff having pressure on themselves to settle the hassle. The procedure puts the stress on the wards to resolve their own problems. One can readily see the advantages for staff and wards alike, if the wards have to come up with solutions to resolve the disputes.

The other option, not used as frequently as mediation, is referral. Referral is used only when a specific problem emerges that a specific agency would deal with. Although many staff have made referrals in the past, we teach a step-by-step procedure of referral that takes numerous issues into consideration. Along with these, we have developed an IRM, Institution Resource Manual, which is a pocket-sized resource manual that the staff carries with him while at work. Many times a crisis can be headed off if the wards can receive information. Beside the IRM, a CRM, Community Resource Manual, is being put together and will be placed in each work area showing all the resources available in the community. Response from staff concerning the IRM's and CRM's has been overwhelmingly favorable. "Why has it taken so long?" is the usual response once they see the pocket-sized IRM.

The procedure, from the contact with the disputants deep in a heated argument, to the close of mediation or referral, requires only 15 minutes to resolve the problem. This efficiency is one of the strongest selling points of the procedure. I can think of times it took hours to resolve disputes before we could allow the wards back into the program. Those hours spent seem like such a waste of time after watching the C.I. procedure work.

Also taught during the 40-hour session is a course on Culture. In it is discussed the cultural influences which become apparent during a crisis situation. Having an idea of the influences of the institution, the institution culture, for example, will assist staff in better assessing and understanding dangerous situations.

Legal issues are also taught. It is essential for staff to learn about the Criminal Justice System in which they work. Questions arising during crisis work, such as staff liabilities for the use of force, policy vs. law, and dispensing legal advice, are some of the issues we deal with in class. Many staff have not had enough exposure to the Criminal Justice System to understand it. Lack of knowledge fosters inconsistencies and fear. We attempt to relax staff by pointing out areas of concern, showing how the system works for and not against them.

Given just prior to the final examination is Consolidation, a block of instruction reviewing the entire Crisis Intervention procedure. This review is needed due to the fast and strenuous pace the class has kept. We discuss the procedure from contact to resolution.

The course is team-taught by two instructors. This adds another element to the classroom, which most students have liked. The classes are quick in tempo and on a schedule sometimes expressively pointed out to us in the

nature of complaints. "You're trying to kill us", "too much work", "we need more time", are some examples of these complaints. However, no one has dropped out from the work, and the students are in high spirits by the end of the week. They feel they have not wasted their week, and all feel they have earned something for their toils.

Role Playing

During the training, we use role players who present the students with problems they must work through. Here at the Youth Training School two classrooms are used. One classroom is used for lecture and the other for practice of the techniques. We videotape this practice and teach from it. This practice area has been referred to as "the arena", "the hot seat", "the gladiator school", and some other labels which good taste forbids telling. These labels come from the intense and real-life role-playing that takes place. This intensity, plus the audience (one's own peers) watching are definite factors which facilitate learning and doing one's best.

We have fun, too. We are all firm believers that the classroom does not have to be dull and devoid of humor. People learn better if they are enjoying what they are doing. This is the atmosphere which we as instructors attempt to create for our class.

Of course, the real test of the effectiveness of the procedure is out of the classroom and on the job. We continue to receive positive feedback from those staff who have had the training and have used Crisis Intervention in an actual dispute situation. Three days after our first class, I had the opportunity to watch two of the students who had been in that class use Crisis Intervention. They work on the roughest team at YTS. Their wards are only accepted on this team if they have shown violent, acting out, behavior. The two staff brought two wards through the procedure allowing *them* the opportunity to settle the dispute. They were able to resolve the dispute and place the wards back into the program within 15 minutes of contact with the hassle. This was far better than locking them up for 24 hours on Temporary Detention as threats to each other. Even if they had locked them up, they would have had to attempt a resolution prior to allowing them back into the program.

Another plus, which has come from the training, shows up as staff who have received the training talk about feeling more secure when they returned to the job. This feeling of security is from knowing what to do. Procedures assist and protect them. Staff are assisted by having a game plan when they deal with disputes. Not only do they have the plan, but all the staff know what to do and can assist each other. The procedure protects the staff member by limiting his involvement on the one hand, and furnishing policy protection on the other. By policy protection—the fact that this procedure is Departmentally accepted—a staff member does not have to worry about losing his job if he uses Crisis Intervention. This takes a lot of stress from staff, allowing a more relaxed atmosphere where rehabilitation can take effect.

A word about our transition from line staff to Crisis Intervention Instructors is in order at this time. In July, 1976, Sam Kason, assistant superin-

tendent of YTS, told the three of us that we had been chosen for a training assignment in Crisis Intervention. He told us that he and Keith Vermillion, superintendent, wanted us to train the school's 600 staff in Crisis Intervention.

We were sent to Sacramento to receive the training. We were to get an impression on the quality of the instruction along with its applicability to YTS staff. Our feelings were those of enthusiasm and acknowledgment of its usefulness at YTS. Following the 40-hour class, we along with the other nine instructors, met with Cal Terhune, at that time deputy director, Parole and Institutions Branch of the Youth Authority. We discussed our commitments to the program and our feelings about its usefulness to the staff. We felt the commitment was worth it, despite the expense.

Mr. Terhune agreed, and his decision was to bring Crisis Intervention to the Youth Authority. After it was decided to go ahead, 12 of us were sent to San Francisco for eight weeks of training by LETRA (Law Enforcement Training Research Association). We were to learn there is a huge difference between being students and instructors. We were all good students, but we all doubted whether we could be the high caliber instructors LETRA was determined to make us. LETRA staff trained the 12 of us. We were to return to our institutions and give the quality of instruction we had received during our 40-hour class to the rest of the Youth Authority.

From the first day we knew eight weeks would never be long enough. Constant stress along with the professional LETRA staff, molded some extremely enthusiastic instructors. The other instructors for the Youth Authority are Jerry Cassesi, Jerry Marasovich, James Carter, Jim Barbour, Jackie Kercheval, Henning Peterson, Bill Adams, Alan Koznek and Steve Briest.

There is a fantastic payoff with this assignment. We get it every day when our fellow staff use the procedure and tell us how good they think the training is. What more is there, when one's own peers are so gracious and appreciative?

ANOTHER LOOK AT P.M.E.S.

BY ROBERTA A. HUNT

Ms. Hunt is a member of staff of the Youth Authority's Program Monitoring and Evaluation System

Development of PMES in the Youth Authority has included circulation of a questionnaire among staff to determine how they feel about the program. This article sums up their responses and comes to some conclusions.

In a previous article entitled "An Inward Look Through PMES," a Program Monitoring and Evaluation System staff member described the background and concepts of the Youth Authority system, along with a brief inventory of its progress. It seems fitting now to look at PMES through the eyes of people who are using PMES, but are not members of the system's staff.

As the PMES Pilot Projects grow in number, the varied implications of such an "accountability" system become increasingly apparent. The complexity of the system is inevitable as PMES is designed to meet the informational needs of (1) staff operating the program, (2) administrators directing the operation of the program, (3) control agencies which approve the funding of programs, and (4) the general public.

The development and implementation of any system requires time and human resources, both of which seldom appear to be in abundance. However, it is advisable to weigh the benefits and the disadvantages of that system to determine its desirability. A surface attempt to "check the scales" resulted in a *PMES Participant Questionnaire*, sent to each committee member of the following PMES Pilot Projects: DDMS, Ward Grievance, Remedial Education, Pupil Personnel Services, Long-Range Planning, Youth Service Bureau Evaluation, Facilities Maintenance, and the San Francisco Project. Here are the participants' Responses¹ to the four questions on the questionnaire:

1. *What benefits do you see coming from what you have done in relation to the PMES PILOT Project?*

"Uniform maintenance standards, uniform maintenance procedures and staffing, computerized maintenance program, moni-

¹ Only minor grammatical changes have been made and deletions to avoid repetition.

toring program for the maintenance program, and uniform maintenance budget for institutions and camps."

"Assistance in managing a relatively large project has been invaluable. Also, PMES alerted research project staff to the concerns of policy makers."

"I believe that PMES is an excellent procedure for sorting out goals and objectives. The performance standards are a good tool for assisting staff in defining measurable evaluation criteria. From all of this, in addition to a better organized program, it also becomes less threatening to staff when they know the specific evaluation criteria."

"It has allowed me to better see the magnitude of the effort we have before us. I hope this will encourage us to be more efficient and to do things with our priorities in mind."

"The PMES Pilot Project definitely helped in organizing the activities of our section, identified work that must be done to conduct these activities and clarified our relationship with other units in the Department."

"I have actually 'done' very little so far. I would hope that the Facilities Maintenance pilot would lead to a means of keeping our physical plants as free from major unexpected breakdowns as possible."

"An improvement in the planning process; an increase in accountability; a better utilization of resources; an improved evaluation system; a vehicle to demonstrate need for more resources; an improved system of delivery of services for wards in San Francisco."

"It provides a very logical methodical way to approach a subject. It provides for the follow-up that has not been provided previously. We have high hopes for the Maintenance Study Pilot Project."

"A greater degree of consensus as to *both* project goals and evaluation goals. Educational benefits to policymakers as to the difficulty of generating 'definitive' results."

2. What problems do you foresee as a result of implementing this system?

"Institutions and camps following the program as laid out obtaining standard maintenance procedures approval from top* management."

"Perhaps too much concern with measuring 'unmeasurables' and too many resources spent to do so (i.e., have policymakers been influenced?). Possibly too much 'paperwork' in monitoring the evaluation project."

"I am concerned about a future time when the system might not receive adequate support and, without adequate staffing, be unable to collect sufficient good data to allow the system to operate properly."

"I do not *foresee* problems—They are staring me in the face right now. Performance standards need to be monitored. If the standards are simple and understandable, then the monitoring should be likewise—was it done, not done, achievement, etc. However, when the monitoring becomes complex and requires development of forms and reports, it becomes a burden, and the entire system is in jeopardy. In my opinion that has happened to the remedial reading and pupil personnel components, and the departmental education PMES report lists, etc., has become the end rather than the means. Resources must be diverted from

education to monitoring. A good system has become bad news. Quite frankly, institution staff must now make reports to justify jobs of Central Office staff. The result is a decided lessening in enthusiasm for PMES. Whether Central Office folk believe it or not, lack of enthusiasm at the institution level could be fatal."

"The data collection may be more time consuming than anticipated. Also, because the department-wide planning program is still evolving and may be subjected to considerable change based on changed conditions and experience, the PMES may have to be revised, also."

"None."

"The system is only as good as the information it receives. This takes staff time and interest. We must find ways of insuring both."

"Lots of work, lots of man hours, but with worthwhile results."

"More conflicts early into evaluation process. There is even the potential that some evaluations will not be undertaken. Possibility that the conflicts will be so great that no benefits accrue to any of the parties."

3. What feelings would you like to share about the PMES conceptual framework and philosophy?

"If I feel conceptual and philosophy of PMES is outstanding and badly needed by the Department. It is hoped that top management will approve and adopt the uniform maintenance program."

"Overall, I would say the benefits have far exceeded any shortcomings and I am grateful for assistance I have received with this project."

"The stated concept and philosophy are good. If it changes to that described in No. 2 above, the ship is going to sink."

"If PMES remains in the CYA, I would like to see it expand beyond monitoring activities to the evaluation of outcome in relation to the yearly objectives and goals."

"Well thought out, good presentations to line staff. Hope PMES will be continued and not dropped like other programs in the past."

"I think that the broader and less well defined a program is, the greater the need for PMES as a means for identifying the program and how it should be carried out."

"I feel very enthusiastic about the PMES conceptual framework and its philosophy. I feel very optimistic that it will alleviate our problems."

"I find no particular problems with them."

"Useful distinction between 'evaluation' and 'research'. Early involvement of potential users planning the evaluation. Sharing of responsibility for interpretation of results beyond just the technical staff. Development of recommendations."

4. *What reactions to PMES have you observed in the field? (If your project has not reached the field, please do not answer this question.)*

"I have developed a PMES for an educational program in a special living unit; the reaction has been positive. It was devel-

oped in conjunction with the trades, lodge administration, teaching staff, and education administrators. Performance standards are clear and the Supervisor of Academic Instruction could easily evaluate them without a lot of reports. The lodge staff have indicated an appreciation for knowing, and assisting in the development of the educational goals and objectives. The instructor has a better view of his role and responsibility. I am not sure that the PMES is the best, but it is a start."

"Some problems in conceptualizing a distinction between 'evaluation' and 'research'."

"Most people in other parole operations do not know about PMES. Those who are familiar with its feel comfortable about it, but think it will result in additional work."

Summary

The PMES Pilot Project participants who responded to the questionnaire are to be commended for their candor and their willingness to share their impressions of PMES with their colleagues.

PMES is generally seen as a guide to organizing programs in a uniform, efficient, prioritized manner. The system may reduce the "threat" usually associated with monitoring and evaluation and provides a much needed "follow-up" function. It may also aid in clarification of inter-unit relationships and stimulate a better utilization of existing resources or document the need for additional resources. Ultimately, the use of PMES could result in improved delivery of services to wards.

The amount of time needed to carry out PMES activities and the paperwork involved, stand out as serious drawbacks to PMES implementation. It is also noted that support from top management in providing staffing and funds is essential, as diverting existing resources to monitoring and evaluation activities is not at all desirable.

The participants' feelings about the PMES conceptual framework and philosophy are overwhelmingly positive. The need for such a system is emphasized, and most are enthusiastic about the benefits that may accrue from departmental use of PMES.

Because most of the "Pilot Projects" have not yet been implemented, it is too early to judge field staff reactions to PMES. However, those who have had some involvement with PMES appear to be supportive, but cautious—they recognize the implications of an increased workload.

There are many questions left to be answered and hurdles to surmount in the program designed for the PMES Project, but it does appear to date that the benefits of PMES implementation outweigh its disadvantages.

IMPLEMENTATION OF A STUDENT VOLUNTEER PROGRAM

BY MICHAEL NAQUIN

Mr. Naquin is acting senior youth counselor at the Youth Authority's El Paso de Robles School

Colleges provide a major source of volunteers for Youth Authority programs—many of them young people who eventually hope to get into correctional work for their careers. This article, by a staff person who works in an institutional living unit, describes ways of organizing programs involving student volunteers.

The use of college students as volunteers on Youth Authority living units may be successful in terms of benefits derived by the wards as well as providing the volunteers with a positive experience in their work with them. The methods of achieving this aim, however, are not always apparent to those developing a program of this type for the first time.

Proper planning to include resource establishments, screening of prospective volunteers, activity scheduling, and goals of the volunteer program will contribute to a well-run meaningful volunteer effort. Community agencies on occasion may serve as a resource for this type of service. Schools and church groups as well may be able to provide student volunteers.

However, generally, the use of college students centers around sponsorship of a local college. One of the better arrangements include using students majoring in the social services area. Many times schools offering social service or a related major will include a class centering around gaining experience and exposure to clients. The volunteer program provides this experience while the students earn college credits for their efforts. From this class, then, those students desiring involvement in the volunteer program may be screened. This process begins by having those students interested in the program filling out an application. This application generally includes data concerning educational, vocational, future goals, and past volunteer experiences. Also, this application should include an open-ended question concerning the reason for the student's desire to participate as a volunteer. In addition, the application should mention the State's legal position in regards to injury while on institutional grounds.

During the actual screening, the interviewer needs to look for several factors in prospective volunteers. These factors consist of the volunteer's intent (does he/she want to pursue a certain activity such as tutoring), motivation or why a person wishes to lend time and service to the institution, maturity, and soundness of judgment. Since college students are often near the same age as the ward population, evidence of positive

impact must be shown. Also, this closeness in ages brings about role identification. This identification should be gauged as positive during the initial interview. Also, on the interviewer's part, the environment in which the volunteer will be working needs to be made very clear. In addition, the interviewer should explain the nature of the Youth Authority, its goals and philosophy. This may also be reviewed in a volunteer meeting with the Youth Authority representative just prior to the first visit to the institution.

Once the volunteers have been assigned and introduced on the living unit, activity scheduling then comes into focus. Activity scheduling is an integral part of the entire volunteer program. The reason for this importance is that regularly scheduled activities encourage enthusiasm on both the ward's and volunteer's part. Volunteers may be utilized in many phases of overall living unit programming. Recreational programs lend themselves very well to the involvement of volunteers. During one summer, the volunteers on the living unit on which I worked organized a series of softball games with the wards on our unit. This made an excellent Saturday afternoon pastime, and the teams were made up of both volunteers and wards on each team. This served to involve the wards and the volunteers with each other. By this involvement, an atmosphere for additional communication was provided. Other successful activities which I have seen include arts and crafts. By developing an arts and crafts program, wards are able to develop skills in this area as well as increase their self-confidence. The volunteer plays a large role by building enthusiasm and by providing instruction to the ward. Most crafts such as leather work, macrame, and rug-making lend themselves very well to this type of program in that they involve a moderate expense for tools and materials. This may be developed on an individual unit basis or as an overall institutional program.

Academic Tutoring

Student volunteers can also contribute in the field of academic tutoring. Often, wards who are "turned off" to school develop an interest in furthering their education after being involved in the tutoring experience. The individual attention used in tutoring has, in past experience, shown an increase in interest on the ward's behalf toward school work. In addition to the individual attention, the element of trust plays a large role in the success of a tutoring program. Wards on my unit who have participated in tutoring express a real enthusiasm because as one stated, "My tutor really helps me and doesn't put me down because I can't read." In this case, the ward had the experience of being "put down" when he asked his peers to write letters home for him. Volunteers, of course, may tutor in any subject that they are knowledgeable; however, student volunteers may be especially valuable in such areas as reading, spelling, grammar, and arithmetic.

During the last quarter of our volunteer program, several of the wards on the work experience living unit showed a renewed interest in return-

ing to school after they were paroled. In addition to the increased interest, several wards improved in reading well enough to read on their own for the first time. Also, several wards who were enrolled in school raised their grades with the extra help they received from our student volunteer tutors. Thus, in measuring the contribution of student volunteers to unit programming, it was determined that the area of tutoring is certainly one of the more important phases in which student volunteers may be used.

An additional area of the unit programming in which the volunteers may be used is within the counseling mode. Wards being able to talk to someone from the "streets" often helps them gain exposure to a non-crime oriented life style. Once a ward mentioned to me that he thought only people on television lived the way his volunteer described his own life. After thinking about this "new" way of living (i.e., a non-crime oriented life style), the ward mentioned to me that it sounded good and that he would give it a try. In using student volunteers in the counseling mode, however, several guidelines should be followed. First, the volunteer should meet with the ward's case worker and receive a general outline as to the direction of the ward's treatment. Second, the development of a close-working relationship between the counselor and the volunteer will be beneficial in working with the ward. Through the joint efforts of both, the ward has the opportunity to make gains in solving his own problems and in developing a method for dealing with his own value structure and behavior. Third, all of the information a volunteer receives about a ward should come from the ward himself. The volunteer may check with the ward's caseworker if he has any additional questions. Since volunteers are not employed by the Youth Authority, they should not be allowed access to the ward's file. Also, within the counseling phase of unit programming, volunteers may be used in caseload meetings or small groups. In my experience, volunteers may add valuable input and an additional perspective of the subject under discussion. Oftentimes, the wards would refer to the volunteer to verify some of their ideas concerning life in the community or expected behavior while on parole.

Best Use of Volunteers

Thus, the involvement of student volunteers as a friend and someone to talk to is the most valuable use of the volunteer's time. Someone who takes extra time to listen to the ward as an individual, helps the ward in his activities, and discussing just him meets the goals of a volunteer program: That of providing another tool for adjustment of the ward to a non-institutional setting to which he will be paroled in the future.



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